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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the years, in an effort to determine the underlying question
of whether a union can, by including a mandatory arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA), effectively waive an employee's
right to a judicial forum, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has engaged the United States Supreme Court in a frustrating game
of "twenty questions."' After many years of uncertainty in this area, the
game still continues with the Supreme Court refusing to answer the ultimate
question of whether such a waiver would be enforceable. 2 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has provided drafting guidance by explaining
straightforwardly that the agreement to arbitrate such claims must be "clear
and unmistakable." 3
Forced to change its ways, the Fourth Circuit has begun to apply this
rigorous standard set forth by the Supreme Court. 4 Although the high Court
has avoided ruling on the ultimate question of enforceability, the Fourth
* 183 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1999).
1 This litany includes the infamous Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20 (1991) (enforcing such waivers in the context of individual employment
agreements), which arose out of the Fourth Circuit, see id. at 24, 35, aff'g 895 F.2d
195 (4th Cir. 1990); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875
(4th Cir. 1996) (holding that Gilmer extends to include mandatory arbitration
provisions in CBAs in the context of civil rights violations); and Wright v. Universal
Maritime Service Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998) (holding that if a CBA mandating the
arbitration of a statutory claim is to be enforceable, it must be stated in "clear and
unmistakable" language), which also originated from the Fourth Circuit, see id. at 394,
397, vacating 121 F.3d 702 (4th Cir. 1997).
2 See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 397 (stating that because the CBA at issue did not
contain a valid waiver of the right to a judicial forum, the Court did not have to reach
the question of whether such a waiver would be enforceable).
3 Id. at 396 (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983)).
When a union negotiates a waiver of employees' rights to a federal judicial forum, the
usual presumption of arbitration does not apply; rather, the CBA must contain a waiver
that is "clear and unmistakable." Id. at 396.
4 See Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining
for the first time that "[i]n the collective bargaining context, the parties 'must be
particularly clear' about their intent to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims"
(quoting Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396)).
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Circuit has reemphasized in its most recent case, Brown v. ABF Freight
Systems, Inc.,5 that a "clear and unmistakable" union-negotiated waiver of
the statutory right to a federal forum will be enforced by the judiciary. 6
Thus submitting to the newly announced standard while maintaining its
stance on enforceability, the Fourth Circuit leaves the Supreme Court with
one final question-"now are we right?"
II. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
OF BROWN V. ABF FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC.
On April 21, 1997, Jerome Brown, a commercial truck driver suffering
from diabetes, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia after ABF Freight Systems, Inc. (ABF)
informed Brown that it would no longer accept his bids for yard and dock
jobs. 7 Brown's complaint alleged that ABF violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)8 and the Virginians with Disabilities Act. 9
In response to Brown's complaint, ABF argued that its CBA with Brown's
union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, required Brown to
submit his ADA claim to binding arbitration pursuant to grievance
procedures outlined within the CBA.10
5 183 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1999).
6 Id. at 322.
7 See id. at 320.
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1994 & Supp. 111996); see also Brown, 183 F.3d at
320.
9 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.5-40 to .5-52 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999); Brown, 183
F.3d at 320.
10 See Brown, 183 F.3d at 320. In pertinent part, Article 37 of the CBA set forth
the "Nondiscrimination" clause by providing that:
The Employer and the Union agree not to discriminate against any individual with
respect to hiring, compensation, terms or conditions of employment because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, age, or national origin nor will they
limit, segregate or classify employees in any way to deprive any individual
employee of employment opportunities because of race, color, religion, sex, age,
or national origin or engage in any other discriminatory acts prohibited by law.
This Article also covers employees with a qualified disability under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
Id. Additionally, Article 8 of the CBA established that "[a]ll grievances or questions of
interpretation arising under this National Master Freight Agreement or Supplemental
Agreements thereto shall be processed as set forth below." Id.
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Guided by the Fourth Circuit's prior decisions in Austin v. Owens-
Brockway Glass Container, Inc. 11 and Brown v. Trans World Airlines,12 the
district court held that the "general agreement" in Article 37 "not to
perform any act violative of any [antidiscrimination] law" combined with
the provision in Article 1 stating that "all grievances... arising under
this... agreement [to arbitration]" divested the district court of
jurisdiction and required submittal of Brown's claims to arbitration.13
Thereafter, Brown filed a timely notice of appeal. 14 Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit held the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's
review of the Fourth Circuit's prior decision in Wright v. Universal
Maritime Service Corp.'5 Moreover, subsequent to Brown's filing of his
appellate brief, but prior to oral arguments, the Fourth Circuit applied the
newly announced standard articulated in Wright to the CBA in the recent
Fourth Circuit case of Carson v. Giant Food, Inc.16 It was in the light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Wright and the Fourth Circuit's subsequent
application of that decision in Carson that the Fourth Circuit considered
Brown's appeal. 17
A. Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.
On February 18, 1992, Ceasar Wright was injured while working as a
longshoreman and ultimately settled a claim for permanent disability under
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 18 With the
approval of his doctor, several years later, Wright sought employment as a
longshoreman through the union.19 Thereafter, Wright was employed by
four stevedoring companies as a longshoreman. 20 Although he received no
1178 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a CBA requiring arbitration of a
union member's statutory discrimination claims is enforceable).
12 127 F.3d 337 .(4th Cir. 1997) (stating that the question of whether a CBA
requires arbitration is a matter of contract law).
13 Brown, 183 F.3d at 320.
14 See id. at 320-21.
15 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998); see also Brown, 183 F.3d at 321.
16 See 175 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[i]nstead, collective
bargaining agreements to arbitrate these claims, unlike contracts executed by
individuals, must be 'clear and unmistakable'" (quoting Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396)).
17 See Brown, 183 F.3d at 321.
18 See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 393.
19 See id.
20 See id.
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complaints about his performance, when the stevedoring companies realized
that Wright had settled a claim for permanent disability, they informed the
union that Wright was not qualified for employment under the CBA and
they would not employ him in the future.21 Wright contacted the union
which advised him to file a claim under the ADA.22 After doing so, the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed the
claim, without prejudice, for failure to pursue the mandatory arbitration
procedures contained within the CBA.23 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed, holding that a mandatory arbitration clause in a CBA may
effectively waive an employee's right to sue, based on its prior decision in
Austin. 24 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 25
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Scalia succinctly targeted the
issue by stating that "[tihis case presents the question whether a general
arbitration clause in a ... CBA requires an employee to use the arbitration
procedure for an alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990.1"26 Thus, the Supreme Court's holding was limited to its view that the
ADA claim was not within the scope of the arbitration clause; the Court
never reached the merits of the Fourth Circuit's decision that a union's
valid waiver of an employee's right to sue may be enforced. 27
Probably the most prominent and frustrating aspect of the Court's
decision in Wright is the fact that the Court begins by recognizing the
"tension" between two lines of cases in this area of law. 28
21 See id.
22 See id. at 394.
23 See id.
24 See id.; see also Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d
875, 885 (4th Cir. 1996).
25 See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 394.
26 Id. at 392-93.
27 See id. at 397.
28 Id. at 395. Compare Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52
(1974) ("Of necessity, the rights conferred [by statute] can form no part of the
collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount
congressional purpose behind Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee's rights
under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver.") with Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) ("Although all statutory claims
may not be appropriate for arbitration, '[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the
party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.'" (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))). In an
effort to resolve this tension, the Fourth Circuit declared that Gardner-Denver
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Whereas Gardner-Denver stated that "an employee's rights under Title
VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver," . . . Gilmer held that the
right to a federal judicial forum for an [Age Discrimination in
Employment Act] claim could be waived. [Wright]. .. and the United
States as amicus would have us reconcile the lines of authority by
maintaining that federal forum rights cannot be waived in union-negotiated
CBAs even if they can be waived in individually executed contracts-a
distinction that assuredly finds support in the text of
Gilmer .... Respondents. . . , on the other hand, contend that the real
difference between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer is the radical
change, over two decades, in the Court's receptivity to
arbitration ... ; Gilmer, they argue, has sufficiently undermined
Gardner-Denver that a union can waive employees' rights to a judicial
forum.
2 9
Nonetheless, the Court stubbornly failed to resolve the important question
of whether Gilmer did, in fact, overrule Gardner-Denver.30 Although
cryptic about that answer, the Wright Court did provide valuable insight
effectively was overruled by the more recent Gilmer decision. See Austin, 78 F.3d at
880-85. However, a majority of other circuits concluded that the Gilmer Court did not
overrule Gardner-Denver, but explicitly distinguished it. See, e.g., Albertson's, Inc. v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 157 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1998) ("As
Gilmer makes clear, that decision does not bear on the right of employees covered by a
collective bargaining agreement to litigate their [statutory] claims."); Harrison v. Eddy
Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1453 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that "the majority view is
that Alexander and its progeny 'remain good law and that statutory employment claims
are independent of a collective bargaining agreement's grievance and arbitration
procedures'" (quoting Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Employment Claims in the
Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77, 84 (1996))); Varner v. National Super
Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996) (observing that "the United States
Supreme Court has held that the pursuit of a claim through grievance and binding
arbitration under a CBA does not preclude a civil suit under Title VII" (citing Gardner-
Denver, 415 U.S. at 49, 94)). Most jurisdictions distinguished the two cases based on
the Gilmer Court's acknowledgement that an important concern in Gardner-Denver
"was the tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights."
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35; see also Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1453-54. Thus, the majority of
circuits have held that while Gilmer stands for the proposition that an individual may
waive his statutory right to a judicial forum, Gardner-Denver stands for the proposition
that the right to a judicial forum cannot be waived by majoritarian process (vis-h-vis a
CBA). See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51-52; Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1453; Malin,
supra, at 84.
29 Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 395 (citations omitted).
30 See id. (stating that "we find it unnecessary to resolve the question of the
validity of a union-negotiated waiver").
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concerning the drafting of mandatory arbitration provisions in CBAs, 31 and
the Fourth Circuit followed the lead. 32
The Wright decision makes it abundantly clear that mandatory
arbitration provisions in CBAs will be subject to rigorous judicial
inspection and thus must be drafted carefully with precise language. 33
Furthermore, there will be no application of the usual interpretive
presumption in favor of arbitration in these types of cases. 34 Rather, an
intent to arbitrate statutory claims will not be found absent a "clear and
unmistakable" waiver of an employee's statutory right to a judicial forum
for claims concerning employment discrimination. 35 Although the Supreme
Court did not decide the issue expressly, the tone of its opinion suggests
that the Court may be receptive to the idea of enforcing arbitration of
discrimination claims once a clear and unmistakable waiver of the judicial
forum has been identified in the CBA.
B. Carson v. Giant Food, Inc.
In September 1996, plaintiffs, current and former African-American
employees of the Giant Food supermarket chain (Giant), brought suit
claiming that Giant and its personnel discriminated against its employees on
the basis of race, age, and disability. 36 They alleged numerous individual
and class claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,37 42
U.S.C. § 1981,38 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),39
31 See id. at 396-97.
32 See Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 1999)
(holding that "the parties must make 'unmistakably clear' their intent to incorporate in
their entirety the 'discrimination statutes at issue'" (quoting Carson v. Giant Food,
Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 1999))).
33 See Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396.
34 See id. at 395-96. The Court reasoned that the rationale behind the presumption
in favor of arbitration is the belief that arbitrators are in a better position than courts to
interpret the terms of a CBA. See id. at 395. However, that rationale is inapplicable in
the case at hand, because the ultimate concern in Wright was with the meaning of a
federal statute, not a CBA. See id. at 396; Brown, 183 F.3d at 321.
35 Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396.
36 See Carson, 175 F.3d at 327.
37 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
38 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
39 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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and the ADA.40 In response, the defendants acknowledged that the
plaintiffs were represented by four different unions and entered into four
different CBAs; however, all four CBAs contained similar language
requiring the arbitration of employee statutory discrimination claims. 41
Moreover, the defendants based their claim on two specific clauses that
appeared in each of the four CBAs--the arbitration clause and the
nondiscrimination clause. 42 Nonetheless, the district court denied Giant's
motion for summary judgment and certified the issue for interlocutory
appeal. 43 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding the following: (1) the
CBAs' arbitration clauses "do not clearly and unmistakably provide that an
arbitrator is to decide which claims the parties agreed to arbitrate"; and (2)
the CBAs' nondiscrimination clauses "do not clearly and unmistakably
require the arbitration of statutory discrimination claims. 44
The Fourth Circuit further explained that the "clear and unmistakable"
waiver requirement can be satisfied through two means. 45 First, this waiver
can be demonstrated through the drafting of an "explicit arbitration
clause."46 Under the first means, "the CBA must contain a clear and
unmistakable provision under which the employees agree to submit to
arbitration all federal causes of action arising out of their employment"-
usually within an arbitration clause.47 However, the court articulated a
40 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1994 & Supp. II 1996); see also Carson, 175 F.3d
at 327.
41 See Carson, 175 F.3d at 327.
42 See id. Three of the CBAs contained the following arbitration clause: "[S]hould
any grievance or dispute arise between the parties regarding the terms of this
Agreement, [the parties will try to resolve the matter].... If agreement cannot be
reached, the parties agree that within five (5) days they shall select a neutral and
impartial arbitrator...." Id. at 328 (alterations in original). One of the CBAs was
slightly different in that it required arbitration of "any controversy, dispute or
disagreement... concerning the interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement."
Id. Additionally, the four CBAs contained nondiscrimination provisions similar to the
following: "[T]he Employer and the Union in the performance of this Agreement agree
not to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment-because of race,
sex, age, color, religious creed or national origin." Id. at 327-28.
43 See id. at 328.
44Id. at 327.
45 Id. at 331.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 331-32. Further, such an arbitration clause will bind parties to arbitrate
under "a host of federal statutes, including Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the ADEA,
and the ADA." Id. at 332.
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second means to meet the valid waiver requirement when the arbitration
clause in the CBA is not explicitly clear, such as clauses referring to "all
disputes." 48 The court instructed that when parties use such broad and
nonspecific language in the arbitration clause, in order to effectuate a valid
waiver, "they must include an 'explicit incorporation of statutory
antidiscrimination requirements"' somewhere within the contract-usually
within a nondiscrimination clause. 49
Ill. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S RESOLUTION IN BROWN
With the benefit of the Supreme Court's decisions in Wright and
Carson, the Fourth Circuit considered Brown's appeal in an effort to
determine whether a union-negotiated waiver of the statutory right to a
federal forum was valid and enforceable. 50 Prior to these decisions, the
Fourth Circuit readily admitted that it would have been inclined to conclude
that a valid waiver was formed in Brown.51 However, in light of the "clear
and unmistakable" waiver requirement, the Fourth Circuit did not find that
the intent of the union to waive its employees' statutory right to a judicial
forum was established in either the arbitration or the nondiscrimination
clause of the CBA. 52
In an effort to satisfy the "clear and unmistakable" waiver standard by
the first means articulated in Carson,53 the court examined the CBA for an
explicit arbitration clause. 54 However, the court found that the arbitration
clause contained in Article 37 of the CBA was "insufficiently explicit to
pass muster" under Wright.55 In other words, the court found that the
clause requiring arbitration of "all grievances or questions of interpretation
arising under ... this Agreement" 56 was too broad-the arbitration clause
was not explicit enough to constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of all
48 Id.; see also Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391, 396
(1998).
49 Carson, 175 F.3d at 332 (quoting Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396).
50 See Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319, 321 (4th Cir. 1999).
51 See id.
52 Id. at 323.
53 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
54 See Brown, 183 F.3d at 321-22.
55 Id. at 321.
56 Id. (alteration in original).
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statutory discrimination claims. 57 The Fourth Circuit further explained that
"[b]ecause the arbitration clause refers only to grievances arising under the
Agreement, it cannot be read to require arbitration of those grievances
arising out of alleged statutory violations." 58
Noting that this was not fatal, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that under
Carson's second means,59 even a "broad but nonspecific" arbitration clause
may still "require arbitration of statutory discrimination claims if [the CBA
contains a provision] with the 'requisite degree of clarity' that the
'discrimination statute[] at issue is part of the agreement.' "60 Nonetheless,
the court found that the agreement not to "engage in any other
discriminatory acts prohibited by law" as set forth in the nondiscrimination
clause of the CBA did not explicitly incorporate the federal statutes; thus,
absent such clarity, the disputes must be resolved in the judicial forum. 61
Showing the rigorous scrutiny involved in these types of cases, the
court further explained that the language may "parallel, or even parrot, the
language of federal antidiscrimination statutes and prohibit some of the
same conduct," but the waiver is not "clear and unmistakable", unless it
explicitly incorporates the federal statutes. 62 Furthermore, the court
continued, "[tjhere is a significant difference, and we believe a legally
dispositive one, between an agreement not to commit discriminatory acts
that are prohibited by law and an agreement to incorporate, in toto, the
antidiscrimination statutes that prohibit those acts." 63 Furthermore,
although the Supreme Court is still silent as to enforceability, once a "clear
57 See id. at 321-22.
58 Id.
59 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
60 Brown, 183 F.3d at 322 (quoting Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325,
331 (4th Cir. 1999)).
61 Id. Further, as a general matter of statutory interpretation, the court noted that
the explicit reference to the ADA at the end of the Article confirmed its finding-that
the Article "covers employees with a qualified disability under the Americans with
Disabilities Act." Id. at 321 n.*. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if all federal
antidiscrimination statutes were already incorporated into the CBA, the sentence
specifying that individuals with a qualified disability under the ADA would be "entirely
superfluous." Id.
62 1d. at 322.
63 Id. (quoting Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391, 396
(1998)).
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and unmistakable waiver" has been found, the Fourth Circuit re-
emphasized that the waiver will be enforced. 64
IV. ANALYSIS: THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE CLEAR AND
UNMISTAKABLE WAIVER
It is now well settled that in order for arbitration to provide a surrogate
for the judicial forum in the context of employment disputes, a CBA must
contain a "clear and unmistakable" waiver. 65 However, this does not
conclude the game. Even if the employee is aware that he is bound by an
arbitration agreement, the employee may not comprehend fully what
consent to such an agreement actually means. 66 This is still a crucial issue
considering the fact the process mandated by such arbitration agreements
has been criticized as being unfair to employees. 67 It may be because of this
realization that the Supreme Court has left open the question as to the
enforceability of such agreements.
Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit maintains its stance with respect to the
enforceability of union-negotiated waivers by answering in the affirmative
that they are enforceable provided the waiver meets the requirements set
forth by the Supreme Court.68 In Austin, the Fourth Circuit first articulated
its view that an agreement to arbitrate ADA and Title VII statutory claims
was enforceable. 69 The panel based its decision on the Supreme Court's
64 Id. at 321. This was not a novel decision by the court. The Fourth Circuit has
declared the enforceability of such waivers both before and since Wright. See Carson,
175 F.3d at 332 (stating that had there been a valid waiver, the judiciary would have
given it full effect); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875,
885 (4th Cir. 1996) (same).
65 Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396 (setting forth the "clear and unmistakable" waiver
doctrine); Brown, 183 F.3d at 321; Carson, 175 F.3d at 325.
66 See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, DIsp.
RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at 8, 11.
67 See id. The following primary criticisms raised by employees are that
mandatory arbitration agreements: (1) require employees to relinquish their statutory
right to a judicial forum controlled by due process; (2) insulate decisions from judicial
review; (3) do not guarantee impartiality on behalf of the arbitrator; and (4) are likely
to allow the employer to choose the arbitrator. See id. For a more in-depth account of
the employee's perspective, see generally Joseph D. Garrison, The Employee's
Perspective: Mandatory Binding Arbitration Constitutes Little More Than a Waiver of a
Worker's Rights, DIsp. RBvSOL. J., Fall 1997, at 15.
68 See Brown, 183 F.3d at 321.
69 See Austin, 78 F.3d at 880-86.
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language in Gilmer, making it apparent that agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims are enforceable. 70 The Gilmer Court "recognized that 'jb]y
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution
in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. '71
The Fourth Circuit further noted that it makes no difference whether a
dispute arises under an employment contract or a CBA. 72 Reasoning that
the union has a right and a duty to bargain for the terms and conditions of
employment, the Fourth Circuit made it clear that there is absolutely no
reason to distinguish between a CBA that bargains away the employee's
right to strike and a CBA that bargains for arbitration. 73 Thus, the panel
70 See id. at 882 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
27-28 (1991)).
71 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). Thus, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, the
primary concern in Gardner-Denver that arbitration is an "inappropriate forum" for the
resolution of statutory rights brought under Title VII was expressly rejected. See
Austin, 78 F.3d at 880 (interpreting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, to mean that arbitration is
a suitable forum for resolution of disputes based on statutory rights). Further, in
support of this proposition, the Gilmer Court stated that criticisms on the adequacy of
arbitration "'res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections
afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,' and as such, they are 'far
out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this
method of resolving disputes.'" Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de uijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
72 See Austin, 78 F.3d at 885 (stating that "[s]o long as the agreement is voluntary,
it is valid, and we are of opinion [sic] it should be enforced"). However, it should be
understood that the union, by bargaining for arbitration, waives a whole slew of the
employees' rights, as follows:
Mheir rights under Article I and Article III of the Constitution; (2) their rights
under the 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendments; (3) their rights to demand that statutory
employment discrimination claims be adjudicated in a federal district court under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence by a
judge, appointed under Article Ill of the Constitution, who will provide instruction
as to the applicable law to a jury chosen in a fair, objective, and non-
discriminatory manner; and (4) their right to appeal an adverse verdict to a
U.S. Court of Appeals or to petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Andrea Fitz, The Debate Over Mandatory Arbitration in Employment Disputes, Disp.
RESOL. J., Feb. 1999, at 35, 74-75. Some commentators argue that it is highly unlikely
that any employee would ever waive all of these rights knowingly. See id. at 75.
73 See Austin, 78 F.3d at 885 ("There is no reason to distinguish between a union
bargaining away the right to strike and a union bargaining for the right to arbitrate.").
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
reasoned, because the right to arbitrate is a term or condition of
employment, a union may bargain for this right on behalf of the
employees. 74
V. CONCLUSION: INCREASING THE ODDS OF ENFORCEABILITY
While Brown is not the anticipated final answer on the issue of
enforceability from the high Court, it at least clarifies the steps a drafter
can take to improve the odds that a court will enforce an arbitration clause
formed in a CBA. 75 The Fourth Circuit directly explains that the CBA
should state expressly that the arbitration clause covers not only disputes
that may arise under the contract but also those disputes arising under all
applicable federal, state, and local employment discrimination statutes,
mentioning each statute by name. 76
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit instructs that it would be wise for the
employer to agree explicitly to comply with the employment discrimination
statutes, again being careful to mention each statute by name. 77 This
double-fisted approach, while in no way guaranteeing judicial approval,
may increase the chances of enforceability during these uncertain times.
Unless you are in the Fourth Circuit, or until the Supreme Court provides
more guidance on the subject, it is unknown what, if anything, will
distinguish an enforceable, clear and unmistakable, union-negotiated
arbitration clause from an unenforceable one.
Laurie A. Arsenault
74 See id.; see also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455
(1957) ("Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quidpro quo for an
agreement not to strike.").
75 See generally Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1999).
Perhaps the question of enforceability will be answered by someone other than the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., S. 121, 106th Cong. (1999) (amending certain federal civil
rights statutes to prevent the involuntary application of arbitration to claims that arise
from unlawful employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, age, or
disability); H.R. 872, 106th Cong. (1999) (same); H.R. 613, 106th Cong. (1999)
(giving employees the right to accept or reject the use of arbitration to resolve an
employment controversy).
76 See Brown, 183 F.3d at 321.
77 See id. at 321-22.
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